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Introduction
The Strait of Melaka is the longest strait in the world, stretching for 
about 800 km from the northern tip of Sumatra to Singapore. It exhibits 
a dual character like no other, being simultaneously a privileged linking 
passage of two seas and two knots of human civilization – India and 
China – and a »bottleneck« that constrains the maritime connections 
between them. Today, the latter aspect is globally dominant. The strait 
is considered and analysed mostly as an obstacle rather than a linking 
point: how to reach China from the West or elsewhere is no longer an 
issue, but securing the vital flows that pass into the strait on a daily ba-
sis undoubtedly is. Accidents, natural catastrophes, political local crises 
or terrorist attacks are permanent dangers that could cut this umbilical 
cord of world trade and jeopardize a particularly sensitive and vulner-
able area; piracy and pollution are the most common local threats and 
vulnerabilities.1
Over 60,000 vessels pass this »bottleneck« point every year, mak-
ing it one of the most sensitive passage areas in sea lanes all over the 
world. In the narrowest point near Singapore, the Strait is less than 
three kilometres wide, which increases the risk of collisions and oth-
er accidents. If the strait was blocked, nearly half of the world’s fleet 
1 Hans-Dieter Evers and Solvay Gerke, »The Strategic Importance of the Straits of Malacca 
for World Trade and Regional Development«, in: ZEF Working Papers, University of Bonn, 2006, 
pp. 8–12; Peter Lehr (ed.), Violence at Sea – Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism, New York: 
Routledge, 2007.
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would have to reroute around the Indonesian Archipelago; several sce-
narios have been extensively studied.2 The notion of chokepoint has 
been adopted, from the vocabulary of world oil transit, to describe the 
peculiar status of the Strait – side-by-side with Bab al-Mandab and 
Hormuz – as the shortest and the most used sea route between the Per-
sian Gulf and Middle East supply areas and the demanding markets of 
Japan, China and South Korea.3
Today, the Strait of Melaka is mostly seen as a danger to world 
economy and a sensitive chord in the regional balance. Throughout his-
tory notwithstanding, it was considered mostly as a connecting spot, 
more a sharepoint than a chokepoint. The Portuguese, being the first 
Europeans to settle in the region, kept this feature throughout their rule 
in Melaka. In fact, it was only in the 19th century that a colonial power 
came to raise the risks of this chokepoint feature and to ensure the safe-
guard of its global Asian interests through a careful surveillance of the 
Strait. The acquisition of Penang, and later the foundation of Singapore 
were unequivocal signs of how sensitive and important it was to the 
British to have a presence on the Strait. The following Anglo-Dutch 
Treaty of 1824 and the foundation of the Straits Settlements definitely 
established the area as vital to the rising British Empire.
Five hundred years ago, the general landscape of world trade was 
much different from now and certainly there was no risk of oil spills. 
But the Strait of Melaka was already a vital key point of Asian trade, 
pirates were a real danger to merchants, commodities and routes and 
political control over this sensitive passage was a permanent source 
of tension and conflict. The homonymous city was a prosperous and 
famous sultanate that caught the attention of the Portuguese from the 
beginning of their presence in Asia. Some questions concerning the 
Strait are to be raised in the context of the arrival of the Portuguese, the 
conquest of Melaka and the general conditions of management of their 
presence in the area, for more than a century. 
2 U.S. Energy Information Administration, »World oil transit chokepoints«, updated Dec. 30, 
2011, http://205.254.135.7/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=WOTC; John H. Noer and David 
Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia, Washington: National 
Defense University Press, 1996, pp. 31–37.
3 Jean-Paul Rodrigue, »Straits, Passages and Chokepoints – A Maritime Geostrategy of 
Petroleum Distribution«, in: Cahiers de Géographie du Québec, 48, 135, 2004, pp. 369–370.
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Melaka, a City and a Strait
The Strait of Melaka acquired an international dimension from the time 
of the empire of Srivijaya (7th–13th centuries), when a permanent trade 
link between India and China was established. The control of the pas-
sage was the main cause of the competition among rival states; Srivi-
jaya eventually emerged as victorious and dominant for several centu-
ries.4 Later on, a new city that claimed to be the heir of this vanished 
empire was founded on the Malay Peninsula and developed throughout 
the 15th century. Its importance and prestige came to give the name to 
the strait where it was located. Like the Srivijaya empire, the Sultanate 
of Melaka was able to exercise some control on both sides of the strait 
and it emerged as a pivotal centre for Indian Ocean trade, at the inter-
section of regional networks, namely the Bay of Bengal, South China 
Sea and Java Sea.5 Privileged relations with Ming China provided pro-
tection against Thai and Javanese political ambitions, and the devel-
opment of mutually beneficial connections with Gujarati, Hindu and 
Northern Java merchants allowed a confluence of a wide range of trade 
interests, from the western markets to the Moluccas. As Keith Taylor 
put it, »Melaka quickly became a new version of the Srivijayan model 
of a Malay-led international entrepôt.«6
In fact, the privileged position of this »interface of three worlds« – 
India, China and the Malay-Indonesian archipelago – not only was able 
to control its main maritime passage, but was located on the linking 
spot of two different monsoon winds that fuelled navigation and trade.7 
As the Portuguese Tomé Pires stated in the 1510s, »Melaka is a city 
that has been built for trade, higher than any other in the whole world, 
at the end of monsoons and beginning of others. Melaka is surrounded 
and stands in the middle, and receives trade and commerce from a large 
spectre of nations, a thousand leagues from each side.«8
4 Mark Cleary and Goh Kim Chuan, Environment and Development in the Straits of Malacca, 
London: Routledge, 2000, pp. 85–87.
5 Kenneth R. Hall, »Local and International Trade and Traders in the Straits of Melaka Region: 
600–1500«, in: Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 47, 2, 2004, p. 249.
6 Keith W. Taylor, »The Early Kingdoms«, in: Nicholas Tarling (ed.), The Cambridge History 
of Southeast Asia, 4 vols., Cambridge University Press, 1999, I, 1, p. 175.
7 Manuel Lobato, »Malaca«, in: A. H. de Oliveira Marques (ed.), História dos Portugueses no 
Extremo Oriente, 5 vols, Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 2000, 1, II, pp. 16–17. 
8 Armando Cortesão (ed.), A Suma Oriental de Tomé Pires, Coimbra: Imp. da Universidade, 
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The aim of the Portuguese was the city, not the Strait. In fact, they 
did not consider it as a real »strait« or »passage«. At an early stage, 
simple references to »the strait« in Portuguese documents relate to the 
Bab al-Mandab one. Later on, they would point to the existence of two 
»real« channels: the narrow passage near Singapore used for the naviga-
tion to and from China, and another one they called »Strait of Sabang«, 
between Sumatra and the island of Kundur, mostly used to access Java 
and the Lesser Sunda islands.9 The name »Strait of Melaka« is gener-
ally absent from Portuguese sources because they probably considered 
it too wide to be called so. The Malay-Portuguese Manuel Godinho de 
Erédia, who had an accurate vision of the surroundings of Melaka, calls 
the Strait the »Malayo Sea« (mar malaio), saying it was the »land-en-
closed sea« (mar mediterrâneo) between Johor and Sumatra.10 The first 
mention of the »Strait of Melaka« in Portuguese cartography is possibly 
the one in the charts of the »Livro das Plantas das Fortalezas« of Vila 
Viçosa, dated somewhere between 1620 and 1640.11
The fame of the city resounded throughout Asia and captured the 
attention of the European newcomers at their very first incursion in the 
East. It was on Vasco da Gama’s voyage that the first information was 
collected: »an island ... with a Christian King« at 40 days’ sail from 
Calicut, where all cloves came from, and also nutmeg, porcelain, silk 
and tin.12 This pack of information proved to be only partly true, but 
the basic data was valid: a trade post where Asian luxury commodi-
ties could be accessed. In the following years, while establishing them-
selves along the western coast of India and trying to get a grip on the 
Malabar spice trade, the Portuguese sent messages to the King D. Ma-
1978, p. 441.
9 Paulo Jorge de Sousa Pinto, The Portuguese and the Straits of Melaka, 1579–1619 – Power, 
Trade and Diplomacy, Singapore University Press, 2012, pp. 54 and 149. On this issue, check 
Peter Borschberg, »Remapping the Straits of Singapore? New Insights from Old Sources« in: 
Peter Borschberg (ed.), Iberians in the Singapore-Melaka Area and Adjacent Regions (16th to 18th 
Century), Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2004, pp. 93–130.
10 J. V. Mills (ed.), »Eredia’s Description of Malaca, Meridional India, and Cathay«, in: 
Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, VIII, 1, 1930, p. 42.
11 Livro das plantas das fortalezas, cidades e povoações do Estado da Índia Oriental com 
as descrições do marítimo dos Reinos e Províncias... Paço Ducal de Vila Viçosa, Vila Viçosa, 
Portugal, cod. 1471, pl. 14–15.
12 E. G. Ravenstein (ed.), A Journal of the First Voyage of Vasco da Gama, 1497–1499, 
London: The Hakluyt Society, 1898, pp. 77, 100.
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nuel, referring to the rich commodities that were waiting for them east-
wards. Melaka was mentioned as the main source of this wealth and an 
important foothold on the way to the kingdom of China.13
These initial years were mostly exploratory and prospective and 
the range of the Portuguese presence did not go beyond Sri Lanka. The 
first viceroy, D. Francisco de Almeida (1505–1508), focused on the 
Malabar spices, the Mamluk naval threat and erecting the first Portu-
guese fortresses in the East. Despite the orders he received to quick-
ly move forward to establish a factory and build a fortress in Melaka, 
nothing was achieved. Melaka and Southeast Asia were far away from 
the Portuguese immediate interests in Asia, and their premature arrival 
in the region, in 1509, may only be fully understood if one considers 
the global projects of King D. Manuel. These were strongly influenced 
by his Messianism and focused on the blockade of the Bab al-Mandab 
strait and the disruption of Muslim trade, that would lead ultimately to 
the fall of the Mamluk Sultanate of Cairo and the recovery of Jerusalem 
for Christendom.14
Melaka was notwithstanding an important piece of his Asian pro-
ject and he urged the Viceroy to send a ship there as soon as possible, 
for two main reasons: first, to access the spices and other commodities 
that were said to flow to the city, and thence to India and the Middle 
East by means of Muslim traders; second, to get there before the Span-
ish rivals eventually did, because there were rumours that Melaka could 
be in the hemisphere conceded to Castille according to the Treaty of 
Tordesillas.15
Because the first viceroy was reluctant to reach Melaka, the King 
decided to send an armada from Lisbon with that specific goal. In 1508, 
Diogo Lopes de Sequeira left Portugal and arrived in the Southeast Asia 
region the following year. His misfortunes in Melaka are well-known: 
13 »Summary of all the letters that came from India«, 1506, in: R. A. Bulhão Pato (ed.), Cartas 
de Afonso de Albuquerque, 3 vols., Lisbon: Academia Real das Ciências, 1898, II, pp. 390–392.
14 Luís Filipe Thomaz, »Factions, interests and messianism: The politics of Portuguese 
expansion in the east, 1500–1521«, in: The Indian Economic and Social History Review, 28, 1, 
1991, pp. 99–103. About D. Manuel’s imperial projects, see Luís Filipe Thomaz, L’Idée Imperiale 
Manueline, Paris: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1990.
15 Letter from King D. Manuel to the viceroy D. Francisco de Almeida, 1506, in: R. A. Bulhão 
Pato (ed.), Cartas de Afonso de Albuquerque, III, pp. 269–271.
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initially welcomed by the Sultan Mahmud Syah, the Portuguese saw 
their movements and range of action curtailed by the powerful Gujarati 
community, who eventually convinced the local Bendahara and the Sul-
tan to expel and imprison the newcomers. The tide would change when 
a captain who shared D. Manuel’s points of view took office as the new 
Governor. This was Afonso de Albuquerque, who became known as the 
builder of the foundations of the Portuguese Estado da Índia.
Afonso de Albuquerque, a Global Strategist
Much has been said about Afonso de Albuquerque and his actions in 
Asia. His most recent biography stresses the complex character of a 
conqueror and strategist whose main ability was to understand the com-
plexity of Asian trade and to think and act in a global scope.16 So it was, 
in fact. He was probably the first man in world history to devise a global 
strategy to control the main fluxes of Maritime Asia as a whole, from 
the east coast of Africa to Southeast Asia, in the service of a European 
power. He was surely convinced he had achieved this goal, as he said 
to the King just a few days before passing away, in a famous statement: 
»I leave [you] India with its main heads under your authority, with no 
other unfinished task other than closing very well the gates of the Strait 
[of Bab al-Mandab]«.17
This global strategy was focused on controlling the most impor-
tant »gates« (i.e., straits) of the Indian Ocean, and at the same time 
knocking down the power of the Sultan of Cairo and his Venetian allies. 
The conquest of Goa was an exception, but it had specific motives: its 
strategic position, its central role in Indian trade and its own attributes 
made it a valuable prey.18 In this context, the Strait of Melaka was a 
secondary and ill-placed target, despite Tomé Pires’ famous statement 
that »whoever is Lord of Melaka has his hands on the throat of Venice«. 
The conquest of the city, in 1511, was the outcome of a personal deci-
sion by the Governor and did not correspond to a previously accorded 
16 Geneviève Bouchon, Albuquerque, le lion des mers d’Asie (Paris: Ed. Desjonquères, 1992).
17 Letter from Afonso de Albuquerque to King D. Manuel, Dec. 6 1515, in: R. A. Bulhão Pato 
(ed.), Cartas de Afonso de Albuquerque, I, p. 381. 
18 Catarina Madeira Santos, «Goa é a chave de toda a Índia» – Perfil político da capital 
do Estado da Índia (1505–1570), Lisbon: Comissão Nacional para as Comemorações dos 
Descobrimentos Portugueses, 1999, p. 94.
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plan or a clear command from Lisbon. On the contrary, his feats of 
arms raised an outcry of protests and complaints to the King, namely 
from an influential group of Portuguese settled in India – the so-called 
»group of Cochin« – who fiercely opposed Albuquerque’s plans and 
whose interests were severely threatened by the takeover of Goa and 
Melaka.19 However, it did not prevent the King ordering the edition of a 
booklet written in Latin and published in Italy to advertise the conquest 
of Melaka throughout Europe.20
The Portuguese were expected to use their naval power to force 
the Sultan to sign a favourable treaty, eventually to the detriment of 
Muslim communities – as they tried to in Calicut – and to build a for-
tress. The conquest of the city, far from the Malabar Coast and Portu-
guese naval bases, was apparently out of the question. Albuquerque’s 
overconfidence and bold character led him to make a risky move, but 
one may also point to misconception and bad judgement as plausible 
causes of the decision. The Portuguese captives in Melaka eventual-
ly gave the Governor the push to attack. One of them, Rui de Araújo, 
managed to send a letter to Albuquerque in February 1510 where he 
described the weakness of the Sultan’s forces and urged Albuquerque 
to conquer the city.21 However, the Chinese and Hindu merchants were 
the main source of information. These, namely a Hindu Keling from the 
Coromandel Coast called Nina Chatu who was his advisor on this is-
sue,22 were certainly interested in persuading the Governor to solve the 
conflict with the Sultan by force, for it would allow them to supersede 
the Gujarati community that was dominant in the sultanate.
Albuquerque did not hesitate to launch an assault on the city. 
Apparently, the decision was taken before his arrival on the Strait. To 
achieve a military victory over Mahmud Syah’s army was a remarkable 
feat of arms, but keeping the city was a different and a rather more com-
19 Inácio Guerreiro and Vítor Luís Gaspar Rodrigues, »O Grupo de Cochim e a oposição a 
Afonso de Albuquerque«, in: Stvdia, 51, 1992, p. 133.
20 Jean Aubin and Luís Filipe Thomaz, »Un opuscule latin sur la prise de Malacca par les 
Portugais, imprimé en Italie en 1514«, in: Archipel, 74, 2007, pp. 107–138.
21 Letter from Rui de Araújo to Albuquerque, Feb. 1510, in: A. Basílio de Sá (ed.), 
Documentação para a História do Padroado Português do Oriente – Insulíndia, 6 vols., Lisbon: 
Agência Geral do Ultramar, 1954, I, p. 20.
22 Luís Filipe Thomaz, »Nina Chatu e o comércio português em Malaca« in: De Ceuta a 
Timor. Lisbon: Difel, 1994, p. 487.
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plex issue. Albuquerque realized that to secure his victory, he needed 
to frame Melaka into Portugal’s global expansion in Asia, proving to 
his King and those who opposed him that the conquest had not been 
an inconsistent adventure. In order to do so, he stayed there for several 
months. There were three main goals to achieve. Firstly, he needed to 
prove that Melaka, despite being located so far away from India, would 
open the gates to the Far East, namely the Spice Islands. That was the 
aim of the expedition led by António de Abreu and the junk of nakhoda 
Ismail that preceded it. One of his men, Francisco Serrão, managed to 
arrive in the Moluccas after a troubled journey, and reach an agreement 
with the Sultan of Ternate.23
Secondly, the Portuguese Governor had to welcome and to reas-
sure the Asian trade communities, enabling the continuity of Melaka as 
a port open to international commerce. To instil confidence into both 
merchants and neighbouring powers was an uneasy task, so the Gov-
ernor kept the basic structure of the city untouched, transformed the 
bendahara and the tumenggong Malay offices into the representatives 
of the Hindu and the Muslim merchants and preserved the low-customs 
policy that had formerly existed.24 He also sent legacies to several king-
doms with messages of friendship and invitations to trade in Melaka, 
and issued safe-conducts. Albuquerque seemed to believe that it was 
possible to replace the head of the city, keeping the rest as it was before 
the conquest. The way he acted with the slaves of the Sultan, having 
announced that he would assure their keep and status as before, was an 
important step into this direction.25
However, both issues were dependent on the ability to manage the 
regional balance and local relations, and ultimately to ensure the secu-
rity of the city. This was definitely the most important and most difficult 
challenge, for it would require a clear perception of local conditions, 
something the Portuguese acquired only after the conquest. The target 
23 Manuel Lobato, Política e Comércio dos Portugueses na Insulíndia – Malaca e as Molucas 
de 1575 a 1605, Macao: Instituto Português do Oriente, 1999, pp. 97–98.
24 Luís Filipe Thomaz, »Malaka et ses communautés marchandes au tournant du 16ème 
siècle«, in: Denys Lombard and Jean Aubin (eds.), Marchands et hommes d’affaires asiatiques 
dans l’Océan Indien et la Mer de Chine, Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 
1987, pp. 31–48.
25 Luís Filipe Thomaz, Early Portuguese Malacca, Macao: CTMCDP, 2000, pp. 147–151.
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of Portuguese attention was the city of Melaka, not the Strait. They 
did not perceive it as a delicate, multipolar region with several powers 
and they were not aware, therefore, of local geopolitics. Most probably, 
they saw Melaka as the dominant power in the region and would con-
sider a single blow – the conquest of the city – as enough to establish 
Portuguese hegemony.
The reality was quite different: not only was there a balance of 
power over the Strait where several political centres played different 
roles, but they were also aligned according to a complexity of relations 
and genealogical connections among existing lineages – involving the 
sultans and the bendaharas – that defined a peculiar framework that the 
Portuguese gradually came to relate with.
This issue would be of secondary importance if the Portuguese 
victory over Mahmud Syah was complete; but it was not. The prom-
inence of Melaka did not rely on a powerful fleet or fearful artillery, 
but on the high prestige of the Sultan’s genealogy among neighbouring 
sultanates. The allegiance of the sea-based people of the Riau-Lingga 
archipelago that controlled the narrow passages of the Singapore straits, 
usually mentioned as Orang Laut, was also an important issue for eval-
uating the real power of the Melaka sultans.26
Local traditions and practices concerning royal status and prestige 
were different from what the Portuguese were used to; cities could be 
taken and destroyed. But as long as the Sultan and his court survived, 
his power remained basically unharmed. Therefore, and acting accord-
ingly to Southeast Asian war traditions, Mahmud Syah faded into the 
forest, waiting for the invaders to plunder the city and go away.27 In-
stead, they remained and built a stone fortress, much to the surprise of 
the Sultan.28 He later moved on and his successors founded the sultan-
ate of Johor in the surrounding area, claiming the ancient prestige of 
the Srivijaya lineage and influence.29 Therefore, two Melakas came to 
26 Pinto, The Portuguese and the Straits of Melaka, pp. 145–147.
27 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450–1680, 2 vols., New Haven/
London: Yale University Press, 1988, I, p. 122.
28 Brás de Albuquerque, Comentários do Grande Afonso de Albuquerque, 2 vols., Lisbon: 
Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 1978, II, pp. 146–147; João de Barros, Ásia, 9 vols., Lisbon: 
Liv. Sam Carlos, 1974–75, II, 2, p. 86.
29 John R. Bowen, »Cultural Models for Historical Genealogies: The Case of the Melaka 
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co-exist after 1511: the Portuguese ruled over the former capital, but 
this was an empty shell; the living organism moved into a new one.
Managing the Strait
The legacy of Albuquerque’s actions in Southeast Asia was a rather 
complex issue to pursue. The Portuguese were now the rulers of a first-
rate emporium in East Asia; their network was the widest in the world, 
stretching from Lisbon to the Moluccas; it would soon spread into Japan 
and China, Melaka being the Eastern pillar of this extended structure. 
In 1513, the Governor presented a triumphant optimistic scenario to 
King D. Manuel, listing the local rulers who were in obeisance or open 
to receive the Portuguese: Sumatra, Kampar, Minangkabau, Pahang, 
»the principal King of Java« (i.e., Mojopahit), besides Siam, Pegu and 
Tenasserim; »all the kings of India are amazed and overwhelmed by 
the feat of Melaka«.30 However, it was a fragile structure. Their control 
over the Strait was always frail despite having a superior naval force. 
Srivijaya and Malay Melaka had control over both sides of the Strait 
through political prominence; the Portuguese, on the contrary, were not 
able to exercise more than a shared hegemony, depending on their ef-
fective force and how they managed to relate with local powers.
The initial phase after 1511 was marked by tension with the former 
Sultan and his attempts to recover Melaka and to neutralize the Portu-
guese diplomatic efforts with local powers. Mahmud Syah, who moved 
first to Pahang, then to Pagoh and finally to Bintang, was a permanent 
threat to Portuguese navigation and diverted part of the trade destined 
for Melaka. Therefore, the Portuguese had an urgent need to gain the 
confidence of the surrounding sultanates and Muslim merchants. At the 
same time, it was convenient to counter-balance the growing promi-
nence of the Hindu Keling in Melaka. So, the second Captain of Mela-
ka, Jorge de Albuquerque, took a decisive step: he managed to reach an 
agreement with Raja Abdullah, the Sultan of Kampar. This character, 
despite being the nephew and son-in-law of the expelled Sultan, de-
clared his allegiance to the Portuguese Crown and in 1514 was appoint-
Sultanate«, in: K. S. Sandhu and P. Wheatley (eds.), Melaka: The Transformation of a Malay 
Capital c. 1400–1980, 2 vols, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1983, I, p. 163.
30 Letter from Afonso de Albuquerque to King D. Manuel, 30 November 1513, in: R. A. 
Bulhão Pato (ed.), Cartas de Afonso de Albuquerque, I, p. 138.
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ed »Regent (mangku bumi) of the Moors and Gentiles« of Melaka.31 
However, the backstage manoeuvres promoted by Mahmud Syah to 
undermine this alliance were eventually successful; shortly after, the 
Portuguese executed Raja Abdullah on a charge of treason, triggering a 
wave of shock and mistrust among neighbouring kingdoms and Muslim 
merchants against the Portuguese.
The Portuguese managed to defeat Mahmud Syah, apparently 
once and for all, in 1526, with a direct and successful strike on the Sul-
tan’s new seat in Bintang. But the sultanate moved away once again and 
his son would settle definitely in Johor. Later on, the relations between 
the two Melakas became gradually more cordial and less tense. A mo-
dus vivendi was established throughout the 16th century, in the shape 
of some sort of a shared control over the Strait. For about two decades, 
from the mid-1560s, there was even an informal agreement between 
the Sultan and the Portuguese Captain to share commodities and trade 
profits.32
Melaka turned out to be the sole Portuguese stronghold in the Strait, 
but it seems that the initial project was to create a network of fortresses 
that could act as supporting or secondary positions in the region and, 
at the same time, to provide important supplies of pepper, produced in 
both Sumatra and Sunda. Such secondary settlements would reinforce 
the security of Melaka and reinsure Portuguese control over the Strait, 
for they were located on the opposite side of the Malay Peninsula. In 
the first case, the Portuguese established good relations with Pasai, at 
the northern tip of Sumatra, precisely at the entrance to the Strait. They 
came to impose some sort of a »protectorate« over the sultanate in a 
brief lapse of time (1521–1523), exploiting the internal tensions and 
the existence of several candidates for the throne.33 The rise of Aceh, a 
new and hostile power that gradually extended its influence in the Strait 
and became the most resilient enemy of Melaka, compromised these 
initial plans.
31 Thomaz, »Nina Chatu«, pp. 503–505.
32 Pinto, The Portuguese and the Straits of Melaka, pp. 143–144.
33 Jorge dos Santos Alves, O Domínio do Norte de Samatra – a história dos sultanatos de 
Samudera-Pacém e de Achém, e das suas relações com os portugueses (1500–1580), Lisbon: 
Sociedade Histórica da Independência de Portugal, 1999, pp. 97–100.
Themenheft 2013] Share and Strife 75
East of Melaka, and following the failure of a permanent settlement in 
Sumatra, the Portuguese attempted to acquire some influence in Java. 
Several factors were at stake: the island was an important supplier of 
rice, the city-ports along the Northern coast were flourishing trade cen-
tres, there was an important pepper production in its western side (Sun-
da) and, finally, the adjacent Strait of Sunda was an alternative route to 
the Melaka passage. Therefore, it was convenient to have a foothold 
in the surrounding region. The Portuguese came to an agreement with 
the Hindu kingdom of Pajajaran, signing a formal treaty (according to 
which the local king would pay tribute in pepper) and leaving a stone 
pillar in order to »take effective possession in the name of His High-
ness«.34 In Java, they tried to arrange an alliance with the Mojopahit 
empire. However, the spread of Islam and the expansion of several Ja-
vanese sultanates, like Japara and Demak, changed the tide and ulti-
mately frustrated Portuguese intentions of a long-lasting settlement in 
the island.35
After an initial anti-Muslim approach, in Southeast Asia as else-
where, the Portuguese came to adopt a more flexible and practical posi-
tion towards Islamic powers. The death of King Manuel definitely put 
an end to the megalomaniac projects of defeating Islam and recovering 
the Holy Land for Christendom. His son and successor John III had a 
much more pragmatic approach to Asian affairs and came to establish 
some sort of an informal peace agreement with the Ottoman Empire 
in order to lower tensions in the Indian Ocean and to allow trade to 
flourish.36
The Strait of Melaka was distant from the recurrent tension that 
pervaded Portuguese activities in the Western Indian Ocean. The lo-
cal balance between Melaka and neighbouring sultanates set the pace 
34 »Possession the captain Francisco de Sá took of the kingdom of Sunda in the name of King 
John III«, July 29, 1527, in: As Gavetas da Torre do Tombo, 12 vols, Lisbon: Centro de Estudos 
Históricos Ultramarinos, 1968, VII, pp. 562–563.
35 Luís Filipe Thomaz, »O Malogrado Estabelecimento Oficial dos Portugueses em Sunda 
e a Islamização da Java«, in: Luís Filipe Thomaz (ed.), Aquém e Além da Taprobana – estudos 
luso-orientais à memória de Jean Aubin e Denys Lombard, Lisbon: Centro de História de Além-
Mar, 2002, pp. 429–440; Jorge dos Santos Alves, »L’Inscription du padrão de Banten (1522)«, in: 
Archipel, 47, 1994, pp. 23–34.
36 Luís Filipe Thomaz, A Questão da Pimenta em meados do século XVI, Lisbon: Universidade 
Católica Portuguesa, 1998, pp. 79–80.
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of commercial activities and political relations. The practical needs of 
survival in a potentially hostile environment came to overlap any other 
concerns of the Portuguese authorities. The Strait was an indispens-
able door to access the Far East that became, in the late 16th century, 
a vital target for both Portuguese merchants and missionaries, with the 
axis of Macao-Nagasaki clearly rising as the most profitable line of 
trade. Therefore, keeping the Strait open to Portuguese navigation was 
a priority and the authorities were permanently worried about possible 
threats that could jeopardize this vital sea-lane.
Theoretically, the Portuguese claimed global control over Asian 
navigation all across the Indian Ocean, through the so-called cartazes, 
safe-conducts issued by the Portuguese authorities conceded to friend-
ly and allied powers, authorizing specific lines of trade. Any ship that 
sailed without these documents was at risk of being seized. It was im-
plemented in the Arabian Sea as early as 1503, in order to distinguish 
friends from foes and to protect those against the common privateering 
practices by the Portuguese.37 It was a political tool rather than an eco-
nomic one, for it was mainly destined to manage relations with Asian 
powers in the initial years of competition between the Cape Route and 
the traditional Levant one. In the Strait of Melaka and in Southeast 
Asia, its use was very limited. Authorizations of this kind were issued 
by the Captain of Melaka according to his own judgement and follow-
ing what was considered to be the general interests of the city. For in-
stance, in 1521, Captain Jorge de Albuquerque gave cartazes to several 
merchants in the Coromandel ports to persuade them to go to Melaka.38 
Later, this sort of safe-conducts included a main item, forbidding the 
transportation of Acehnese, who were considered to be enemies of Mel-
aka.39
In practical terms, the Portuguese »rule« over the Strait came to 
be imposed not over neighbouring powers as an official strategy, but in 
an informal way: on Asian mercantile communities that traditionally 
37 Luís Filipe Thomaz, »Do Cabo Espichel a Macau: vicissitudes do corso português«, in: 
Artur Teodoro de Matos e Luís Filipe Thomaz (eds.), As Relações entre a Índia Portuguesa, a Ásia 
do Sueste e o Extremo Oriente, Macao/Lisbon, 1993, pp. 552–553.
38 Luís Filipe Thomaz, Os Portugueses em Malaca, Lisbon, 1964, unpublished thesis, I, p. 
185.
39 Diogo do Couto, Da Ásia, 15 vols., Lisbon: Liv. Sam Carlos, 1974–75, X, 2, p. 206.
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used Melaka as a port of call. It took the form of patrolling armadas 
that reassured the safety of the passage to both Portuguese and Asian 
navigation but were also used to force merchant ships to go to Melaka 
instead of other neighbouring – and rival – ports: »it is truly necessary 
to always have our armadas [in the Strait of Singapore and Sabang]to 
collect the ships, both ours and of the people that are our friends and 
come to this fortress and pay their customs duties.«40
This practice – that has been called »forced trade«41 – became 
usual in the late 16th century, and came to reduce the ability of Mel-
aka to attract Asian traders. It became critical as the Captains of the 
fortress gradually grabbed the most important lines of commerce as-
sociated with Melaka and committed frequent extortions, claiming ex-
clusive rights and forcing prices and favourable conditions to buy and 
sell commodities. When their demands were excessive or they acted 
in a violent way, traders avoided the city and looked for other ports 
where conditions were more peaceful or favourable. Complaints about 
these despotic acts by the Captains and the decreasing number of Asian 
merchants in the city are common in all Portuguese documentation and 
other coeval sources. The clearest example may have been the one of 
Chinese merchants (namely the chinchéus from Fujian), who gradual-
ly removed themselves from Melaka, not only because they had more 
convenient ports at their disposal, like Banten, but also because of the 
extortions exercised by the Portuguese, something that was even ech-
oed in official Ming records.42
A Triangle
The Sultanate of Aceh gradually emerged as the most powerful and 
defiant enemy over the 130 years of Portuguese rule of Melaka.43 Once 
a small power, it rose as the most important node of the re-oriented 
40 »News from India«, 1605, in: Documentação Ultramarina Portuguesa, Lisbon: Centro de 
Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1960, I, p. 147.
41 Lobato, Política e Comércio, p. 197–199. 
42 »History of the Ming Dynasty«, in: W. P. Groeneveldt (ed.), »Notes on the Malay Archipelago 
and Malacca«, Miscellaneous Papers Relating to Indo-China and the Indian Archipelago, London: 
Trubner & Co., 1887, I, pp. 253–254.
43 Hamirul Hadi, Islam and State in Sumatra – A Study of Seventeenth Century Aceh, Leiden: 
Brill, 2004, pp. 21–36.
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and reorganized Muslim trade networks after the fall of Melaka to the 
Portuguese, mostly based on the reinvigorated Gujarati community that 
defied the Portuguese trade structures from Southeast Asia to the Red 
Sea.44 But Aceh was not just an important rival in trade affairs. It also 
became an expanding power that gradually extended its control over the 
pepper-producing areas of Sumatra and tried to dominate other Malay 
sultanates. This expansion would bring about a tense and delicate bal-
ance among the three main powers that shared, so to speak, the hegem-
ony in the Strait: Aceh, Melaka and Johor.45
In the 1560s, Portuguese presence in Asia confronted a new, 
globally adverse scenario, marked by coordinated strikes from several 
Muslim powers across the Indian Ocean on Portuguese positions and 
navigation. The Portuguese Estado da Índia was ill-prepared to repel 
the offensive, being under a complex process of reform that affected 
the whole overseas empire.46 In Southeast Asia, Aceh claimed the role 
of an Islamic vanguard against the peringgi, as the Portuguese were 
locally called. Formal contacts with the Ottoman Empire were estab-
lished – two envoys were sent to Istanbul in 1562 to purchase artillery 
and to hire gunners and cannon founders, and a legate was dispatched 
to Banda Aceh to escort the envoys back – allegedly to prepare for war 
against the Portuguese.47
In fact, relations between Aceh and Melaka had been unstable in 
the previous decades, ranging from peaceful trade to incidental hostili-
ty, but the new environment led to a state of open war. Its most visible 
expression was the sieges of Melaka carried out by Aceh in 1568 and 
three consecutive attempts in the 1570s. It also involved a widespread 
attack on Portuguese navigation in the Strait region, causing a moment 
of general danger for navigation with attacks and reprisals from the 
44 C. R. Boxer, »A Note on Portuguese Reactions to the Revival of the Red Sea Spice Trade 
and the Rise of Atjeh, 1540–1600«, in: Journal of Southeast Asian History, X, 1969, pp. 416–428.
45 Paulo Jorge de Sousa Pinto, »Melaka, Johor and Aceh. A bird’s eye view over a Portuguese-
Malay triangular balance«, in: Arquivos do Centro Cultural Calouste Gulbenkian, XXXI, 1996, 
pp. 117–121.
46 Luís Filipe Thomaz, »A Crise de 1565–1575 na História do Estado da Índia«, in: Mare 
Liberum, 9, 1995, pp. 481–519.
47 Giancarlo Casale, »›His Majesty’s Servant Lufti‹ – the career of a previously unknown 
sixteenth-century Ottoman envoy to Sumatra based on an account of his travels from the Topkapi 
Palace Archives«, in: Turcica, 37, 2005, pp. 49–52.
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Portuguese and their Malay and Javanese neighbours.48 The situation 
forced the authorities in Lisbon to take unprecedented measures: to dis-
patch an armada directly to Melaka in 1576 under the command of 
Matias de Albuquerque, that was able to remove the threat and to re-es-
tablish minimum levels of security for Portuguese ships in the area.49
In the following decade, the issue of controlling the Strait and 
keeping the sea-passage safe for Portuguese shipping became critical. 
A new, disturbing fact emerged from the political balance inside the 
Melaka-Johor-Aceh triangle. The two rival sultanates came closer, a 
change that raised the alarm amongst Portuguese ranks. In fact, despite 
the proclaimed Islamic solidarity and the apparent support of the Aceh-
nese jihâd, Johor had been previously very suspicious and reluctant to 
give some effective support against Melaka. Aceh was a more menac-
ing threat than the Portuguese. The Sultans were aware of the fact that 
the fall of Melaka into Acehnese hands would unbalance the geopo-
litical scenario of the Strait. Moreover, their capital Johor Lama was 
attacked by Aceh forces in 1564, who took the Sultan Alauddin Riayat 
Syah prisoner, and four years later the new Sultan Muzaffar Syah joined 
the Portuguese against the Acehnese siege on Melaka.50
But in the decade of 1580, the conditions changed and the two 
sultanates established an alliance against the Portuguese. The motives 
were essentially of a political nature: both in Johor and in Aceh new 
rulers came to power and opted for a mutually beneficial agreement, 
sealed by a marriage. Melaka was therefore in a dangerous position; the 
basic survival strategy of the Portuguese in the Strait region had been 
the mistrust between the rivals. A hostile Aceh-Johor alliance was a risk 
that should be taken seriously, because it could foreshadow more vigor-
ous attacks on Melaka and on Portuguese trade and a general blockade 
on both sides of the Strait.
48 Hubert Jacobs, »Un Réglement de Comptes entre Portugais et Javanais dans les Mers de 
l’Indonésie en 1580«, in: Archipel, 18, 1979, pp. 159–173.
49 Manuel Lobato, »A Carreira da Índia e a variante de Malaca (1507–1641)«, in: A Carreira 
da Índia e as Rotas dos Estreitos – Actas do VIII Seminário Internacional de História Indo-
Portuguesa, Angra do Heroísmo, 1998, pp. 356–358.
50 Diogo do Couto, Da Ásia, VIII, pp. 144, 168–170; António Pinto Pereira, História da Índia 
no tempo em que a governou o Visorei Dom Luís de Ataíde, Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional-Casa da 
Moeda, 1987, p. 236.
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In Aceh, the new Sultan Mansur Syah (1579–1586) was a foreigner 
from Perak. His alliance with Johor may have been a solution to achieve 
external support in order to compensate for his obvious lack of internal 
strength. According to Portuguese sources, he was a fierce enemy of the 
Portuguese and was responsible for the execution of some, namely the 
highly praised martyrdom of Luís Monteiro Coutinho, in 1584.51 Lat-
er on, the Portuguese authorities in Lisbon were informed that he was 
building a fortress in his homeland, Perak. They feared that it would 
be a supportive base of operations for Acehnese fleets that could at-
tack Melaka more easily and intercept Portuguese movements to and 
from India.52 A blockade was to be feared, especially if in co-ordination 
with a similar move from Johor, on the Eastern side, i.e., the Singapore 
Straits, something that effectively took place in 1585–87.
Ironically, the most serious threat posed to Melaka in the late 16th 
century did not come from Aceh but from Johor. The Sultan Ali Jalla 
Abdul Jalil Syah (1580–1597) achieved unprecedented prominence in 
the regional balance, thanks to his diplomatic skills and political lead-
ership. Under his command, Johor managed to slowly emerge as the he-
gemonic power in the Strait region, thanks to a carefully outlined policy 
towards Melaka and Aceh. About the Portuguese, Ali Jalla understood 
that the power in Melaka was in the hands of the Captains, who at this 
time virtually controlled most of the trade in the city. Therefore, he 
came to renew and reinforce an informal agreement already operative 
since the 1560s: Javanese trade – the most important community that 
supplied Melaka with spices and other commodities – was diverted to 
Johor, where taxes and customs were paid, in an apparent imitation of 
the abovementioned Portuguese »forced trade« practices.53 Both the 
Sultan and the Portuguese Captain profited, but the Royal Treasury in 
Melaka was considerably damaged.54
51 Manuel Godinho de Erédia, História de Serviços com Martírio de Luís Monteiro Coutinho, 
Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon, Res. 414; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, »Pulverized in Aceh: On Luís 
Monteiro Coutinho and his ›Martyrdom‹«, in: Archipel, 78, 2009, pp. 19–60.
52 Letter from the Viceroy of Portugal to King Phillip I, Dec. 12 1586, Archivo General de 
Simancas, Secretarias Provinciales, lib. 1550, fl. 701; letter from King Phillip I to the Viceroy of 
India D. Duarte de Meneses, Jan. 21 1587, in: Basílio de Sá (ed.), Documentação, V, p. 63.
53 Lobato, Política e Comércio, p. 197.
54 Pinto, The Portuguese and the Straits of Melaka, pp. 86–87.
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While managing to control, to some extent, the Portuguese menace (he 
openly boasted that he did not fear the Portuguese because they were 
too greedy), Ali Jalla made an alliance, sealed with a marriage, with the 
new Acehnese Sultan. His plan most probably included a co-ordinated 
double blockade on Melaka and a direct attack that would defeat the 
isolated Portuguese, as soon as his Acehnese allies had finished their 
arrangements, as mentioned above.
The Portuguese were fully aware of the danger. They acknowl-
edge the prestige of Johor among the Malay sultanates, calling him 
»Emperor of all the Malays«.55 The allegiance of the sea-based people 
of the Riau-Lingga Archipelago that controlled the straits of Singapore 
was also a threat to consider. Clear and disturbing information about the 
»noose around Melaka’s neck« started to reach the authorities in Goa.56
The Portuguese reaction eventually frustrated his global plans and 
forced him to move forward prematurely, launching a preventive attack 
on Melaka at the beginning of 1587. Later, the Portuguese captured an 
envoy from Johor on his way to Aceh, through whom they found out 
that Ali Jalla was waiting to join forces to attack Melaka. He had with 
him a letter addressed to the Sultan of Aceh with the following words: 
»Melaka is like a seed field; without water, it dries, so stand by and 
come, for I’ll be with you with my fleet to take it together.«57 Mean-
while, Mansur Syah died and neither the double blockade nor the joint 
strike on Melaka took place.
However, Johor managed to blockade the Strait of Singapore, pre-
venting the passage of the expected armada from Macao, and fully di-
verted Javanese trade to his capital. The arrival of a rescue fleet from 
Goa, under the command of D. Paulo de Lima Pereira, and the attack 
and destruction of the capital Johor Lama put an end to this episode. 
Like Mahmud Syah had done half a century before, the Sultan fled the 
city and founded another capital a few miles upriver.
Until the end of the century, Melaka was able to keep the Strait 
passage open and without further disturbances. Internal turbulence in 
55 Diogo do Couto, Da Ásia, VIII, p. 166; other sources in Pinto, The Portuguese and the 
Straits of Melaka, p. 147, note 72.
56 Letter from Viceroy D. Duarte de Meneses to King Phillip I, Nov. 23 1587, Archivo General 
de Simancas, Secretarias Provinciales, lib. 1551, fl. 71v.
57 Diogo do Couto, Da Ásia, X, 2, p. 445.
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Aceh and a new period of distrust among the two sultanates foreshad-
owed a peaceful management of the Strait. Moreover, in 1592 the Aceh-
nese Sultan Alauddin Riayat Syah al-Mukammil (1589–1604) made an 
unexpected peace offer, in the aftermath of the shipwreck of a nau on 
the shores of Sumatra, on its way from Goa to Macao. It was not a 
simple truce: in exchange for the return of the Portuguese (the Bishop 
of Macao being among them) and a peace treaty, the Sultan required 
permission to go along the Strait and to pass through Melaka with his 
war fleet en route to Johor, without being harmed by Portuguese forces. 
It was the prelude to a brief and unprecedented period of intense dip-
lomatic contacts and exchange of embassies, gifts and projects, during 
which the Sultan promised to provide cargoes of pepper to the Portu-
guese and to authorize them to erect a fortress in his kingdom. Melaka 
enjoyed a period of regional prominence, taking advantage of renewed 
mutual hostility between Aceh and Johor. As the Viceroy D. Francisco 
da Gama put it in a letter to the King, »With Our Lord’s help, they will 
destroy each other.«58 It was brief, however, for a far more serious threat 
was on its way.
A Changing Tide
By the turn of the century, the Portuguese soldier Francisco Rodrigues 
Silveira had written a premonitory opinion in his work about the much 
needed reformation of the Portuguese Estado da Índia: »Today, these 
individuals from Zeeland have come in right under the nose of the Vice-
roys, plundering and upsetting the trade and commerce in spices: and 
tomorrow, due to our own lack of order, they will try to evict us from 
our own houses.«59 The most visible impact of the Dutch arrival in Asia 
would be felt in Southeast Asia. Unlike the Portuguese, whose presence 
spread from Mozambique to Japan, the Dutch concentrated their efforts 
on a few specific spots in the region, in areas where Portuguese naval 
forces were sparse and where the most coveted commodities could be 
found, namely Sumatra, Sunda and the Moluccas. The first Dutch expe-
dition to the East went directly to Banten via the Sunda Strait, and the 
58 Letter from D. Francisco da Gama to Phillip I, April 1598, Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon, 
Res. 1976, fl. 91v. 
59 Francisco Rodrigues Silveira, Reformação da Milícia e Governo do Estado da Índia 
Oriental, Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 1996, p. 90.
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second one to Aceh. In the initial years, the Dutch avoided the passage 
through the Melaka Strait in order to escape Portuguese armadas and to 
lay the foundations of what would be the Dutch East Indies. One might 
say that it was the first time that the Sunda Strait outpaced the Melaka 
one as a commercial target and a political priority.
However, it was just a provisional option. As the punitive efforts 
by the Portuguese authorities to fight them failed one after the other, 
their presence in the Melaka Strait became frequent. The first serious 
blow to the Portuguese presence in the area took place in 1603 in a 
famous episode, the capture of the Portuguese carrack Santa Catarina 
in the Johor River.60 It was now clear that the initial period of com-
promise was over and the new V.O.C. Company definitely opted for 
assaulting Portuguese navigation in Asia, prompting a big debate over 
free trade, natural rights and international law.61 Not only were the Por-
tuguese ships now under risk of being seized by the European enemies, 
but Melaka itself became a target, having suffered a hard siege in 1606.
Besides the gradual hostility towards the Portuguese, Dutch pene-
tration in the region followed a clear strategy: to find adequate sources 
of spices and establish themselves in these centres through commercial 
treaties, and to look for political alliances that would give them stability 
and support against the rival Portuguese. Generally speaking, they were 
welcomed in most places where they progressively established trade 
agreements.
In the Strait of Melaka, the balance gradually became hostile to 
Portuguese interests. In Aceh, negotiations for a treaty dragged on for 
several years without visible results. The Portuguese hesitated between 
an agreement and the use of force. However, in 1605 a powerful ar-
mada, under the command of the Viceroy of India, arrived in the re-
gion to expel the Dutch from the Strait region. On its way to Melaka, 
he decided to launch an attack on Banda Aceh, with disastrous conse-
60 Peter Borschberg, »The Seizure of the Sta. Catarina Revisited: The Portuguese Empire in 
Asia, VOC Politics and the Origins of the Dutch-Johor Alliance (1602–c.1616)«, in: Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 33, 1, 2002, pp. 31–62.
61 Two recent works have shed light on these questions and the legal issues that followed the 
capture of the Santa Catarina: Martine Julia van Ittersum, Profit and Principle: Hugo Grotius, 
Natural Rights Theories and the Rise of Dutch Power in the East Indies (1595–1615), Leiden: 
Brill, 2006) and Peter Borschberg, Hugo Grotius, the Portuguese and Free Trade in the East 
Indies, Singapore: NUS Press, 2011.
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quences. The accession of Iskandar Muda to the throne, two years later, 
definitely brought to an end the period of truce between Melaka and 
Aceh. However, the Dutch did not take advantage of this scenario. The 
incoming Sultan started a new period of territorial expansion and strict 
control of pepper production that was not compatible with the aspira-
tions of the VOC. Therefore, the relations between Aceh and the Dutch 
were always marked by sharp tension and mutual mistrust.
The case of Johor was substantially different: the arrival of the 
Dutch gave the sultanate the opportunity to be reassured of its position 
and relieve the pressure from the Portuguese and Aceh. In 1602, the first 
contacts with Jacob van Heemskerk took place and the Sultan sent leg-
ates to the United Provinces, preparing an agreement. At the same time, 
the former Captain of Melaka Francisco da Silva de Meneses attacked a 
junk from Johor and killed all the passengers, including an ambassador 
en route to Perak.62 The incident of the Santa Catarina in the following 
year caused a definitive rupture between Melaka and Johor and pushed 
the sultanate into a formal alliance with the Dutch.
The Portuguese tried to paddle against the tide, preparing strong 
armadas destined to defeat and expel the Dutch fleets and to punish 
the Asian powers that welcomed them, but with no effect. The last at-
tempt took place in 1615–1616, when a joint armada from Manila and 
Melaka, gathering naval resources from both Portuguese and Spanish 
structures, failed to achieve any success.63 At this time, the Portuguese 
revived old projects of erecting new fortresses in several spots, in order 
to combat the Dutch penetration in a more effective way. In the Melaka 
Strait, there were proposals to erect fortresses in the narrow passages 
of Singapore and to have continuous patrolling fleets in the area to ob-
struct the passage of Dutch ships.64 There are a few hints about the erec-
tion of a fortification in Muar by Manuel Godinho de Erédia in 1604, 
but it is doubtful that it was ever more than a project. 
62 Jacques de Coutre, Andanzas Asiáticas, Madrid: Historia 16, 1991, p. 165.
63 Peter Borschberg, »Security, VOC Penetration and Luso-Spanish Co-operation: The Armada 
of Philippine Governor Juan de Silva in the Straits of Singapore, 1616«, in: Peter Borschberg (ed.), 
Iberians in the Singapore-Melaka Area, pp. 35–62.
64 For instance, by Jacques de Coutre, »Information urging the building of some castles or 
fortifications in Singapore Strait and other parts of the South«, 1628, in: B. N. Teensma (ed.), 
Como Remediar o Estado da Índia?, Leiden: Leiden Centre for the history of European Expansion, 
1989, pp. 16–21.
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Harassed by all sides, suffering from the competition moved by 
the Dutch VOC and the English EIC and struggling with a serious fi-
nancial crisis, the Estado da Índia was in no condition to release funds 
for such proposals. In 1619, the Viceroy of India confessed that he did 
not have »a dime« to spare for the erection of new fortresses, no matter 
how much smaller they might be, and the available money was not even 
enough for the regular armadas.65
Facing a tremendous challenge by the Dutch, gradually losing its 
prestige in the regional balance and no longer able to attract – or force – 
Asian trade communities to be present, Melaka declined. According to 
the chronicler António Bocarro, 1615 was the last year in which nutmeg 
and mace were sold in the city.66 In fact, the Dutch imposed their hostile 
presence in the Strait and forced Portuguese navigation to adopt de-
fensive strategies: the carracks loaded with Chinese commodities from 
Macao passed the Strait with an escort armada and local traffic made 
use of small-oared ships, more likely to evade Dutch surveillance. The 
city’s fortifications were improved throughout the following decades, 
giving Melaka the semblance of a stronghold.
Initially established in Banten, the Dutch moved in 1619 to Bat-
avia, in accordance with the ambitious plans of the Governor Jan Piet-
erszoon Coen (1619–1623/1627–1629). The headquarters of the VOC 
were definitely settled in Sunda, giving the Company full access to the 
two passages, the Strait of Melaka and the Sunda one. In the decade of 
the 1630s, Dutch power over the Portuguese was complete: the strategy 
adopted by the Governor Antonio van Diemen (1636–1645) focused on 
the blockade of the nerve centres of the Estado da Índia, namely Goa 
and Melaka. Isolated and impaired, struggling for its survival, the city 
finally surrendered to the Dutch in 1641, after a long siege.67
65 Letter from the Viceroy D. João Coutinho to Phillip II, Feb. 28 1619, IV, in: R. A. Bulhão 
Pato (ed.), Documentos Remetidos da Índia, 5 vols., Lisbon: Academia Real das Ciências, 1893, 
IV, p. 352.
66 António Bocarro, Década 13 da História da Índia, 2 vols., Lisbon: Academia Real das 
Ciências, 1876, I, p. 461.
67 P. A. Leupe, »The Siege and Capture of Malacca from the Portuguese in 1640–1641: 
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